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Web browsers are an integral part of people’s everyday life. The browser is
required to manage high privacy tasks, including bank account management, ex-
amination of patient records, and all the small and large aspects of life in the
form of email and social media. Web page environment develops in a continu-
ously more diverse path, which broadens the browser attack surface and makes
protecting browser from security vulnerabilities more challenging.
One challenging feature is that a page is allowed to include third-party documents
into the page content. A web browser prevents this page from reading the actual
content of those third-party inclusions. However, cross-origin inclusion support
induces security issues relating to hidden channels. One family of those issues is
formed by cross-origin timing attacks.
This master’s thesis describes an attack method where a malicious page steals
sensitive secrets from third-party pages. The attack abuses search functionality
by triggering browser to perform multiple third-party loads to a targeted search
engine, which in specific situations leaks sensitive cross-domain information via
timings. We perform a practical attack, where a page controlled by the attacker
manages to reveal email content from a simulated web mail service. In addition
to this, we introduce a measurement tool, which is built to simplify the process
of revealing and fixing those vulnerable web services.
Furthermore, we bring out a security issue affecting Mozilla Firefox browser,
which I found during writing this thesis. This vulnerability CVE-2016-2830 is a
high level security finding approved by Mozilla. The vulnerability enables a web
page to perform new requests even after an attacking page has been closed. This
makes it possible to perform Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF ) attacks for a
much longer time from the closed page.
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Verkkoselaimella ka¨sitella¨a¨n yha¨ arkaluontoisempia ja luottamuksellisempia tie-
toja. Selaimet suorittavat ka¨sittelema¨a¨nsa¨ sisa¨lto¨a¨ ja ovat siten tekemisissa¨ hen-
kilo¨iden arkipa¨iva¨isissa¨ tai tietosuojaa edellytta¨vissa¨ asioissa, kuten pankkitilin
hallinnoinnissa, potilastietojen tarkastelussa ja vaikkapa sa¨hko¨postin ja sosiaalis-
ten sivustojen kautta koko ela¨ma¨n pienissa¨ yksityiskohdissa. Verkkosivujen sisa¨lto¨
ja rakenne kehittyva¨t yha¨ entista¨ monipuolisemmiksi, mika¨ laajentaa selaimeen
kohdistuvaa hyo¨kka¨yspinta-alaa, ja tekee suojautumisesta haastavampaa.
Era¨s haasteita aiheuttava ominaisuus on selaimen mahdollisuus liitta¨a¨ sivustoon
kolmannen osapuolen sisa¨lto¨a¨. Selain esta¨a¨ teknisesti liitta¨va¨a¨ sivustoa lukemas-
ta liitta¨ma¨a¨nsa¨ sisa¨lto¨a¨ suoraan, mutta ta¨ma¨ mahdollisuus sisa¨llytta¨a¨ kolmannen
osapuolen sisa¨lto¨a¨ sivuille aiheuttaa haasteita tietoturvassa syntyvien piilokana-
vahaavoittuvuuksien muodossa. Ta¨ha¨n hyo¨kka¨yskategoriaan kuuluu tutkimani
selaimen sivulatauksia hyo¨dynta¨va¨t aikahyo¨kka¨ykset.
Ta¨ma¨ tyo¨ esittelee hyo¨kka¨ystavan, jolla pahantahtoinen verkkosivu voi sisa¨lto¨a¨
lataavalla aikahyo¨kka¨yksella¨ tietyissa¨ olosuhteissa paljastaa kokonaisia mielival-
taisia merkkijonoja kohdesivustolta hyo¨dynta¨en sivuston hakutoiminnallisuut-
ta na¨kema¨tta¨ hakutuloksia. Ta¨ssa¨ esitelta¨va¨ssa¨ ka¨yta¨nno¨n kokeessa hyo¨kka¨a¨va¨
sivusto onnistuu varastamaan simuloidusta sa¨hko¨postista viestin sisa¨lto¨a¨.
Tyo¨ssa¨ on tuotettu mittaustyo¨kalu, jolla sivustot, jotka ovat alttiita kyseiselle
hyo¨kka¨ykselle, ovat helpommin testattavissa ja siten korjattavissa.
Ta¨ssa¨ tyo¨ssa¨ julkaistaan myo¨s Mozilla Firefox -selaimesta tyo¨n aikana lo¨yta¨ma¨ni
haavoittuvuus CVE-2016-2830, jonka Mozilla luokitteli korkean tietoturvatason
haavoittuvuudeksi. Haavoittuvuus mahdollistaa sivuston luoda uusia verkkoyh-
teyksia¨ mielivaltaisiin verkkoresursseihin, vaikka selain olisi jo hyo¨kka¨a¨va¨lta¨ sivus-
tolta aikaa sitten poistunut. Ta¨ma¨ mahdollistaa siten CSRF -hyo¨kka¨yksen (Cross-
Site Request Forgery) suljetulta sivustolta.
Asiasanat: tietoturva, selain, sivulataus, aikahyo¨kka¨ykset, kolmannen os-
apuolen hakusivuston va¨a¨rinka¨ytto¨, hyo¨kka¨ysmenetelma¨
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
Ajax Asynchronous JavaScript and XML
Apache World’s most used web server software
API Application programming interface
BFS Breadth-first search
CSP Content Security Policy
CRIME Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy
CORS Cross-origin resource sharing
CSRF Cross-site request forgery
CSS Cascading Style Sheets
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DFS Depth-first search
DNS Domain Name System
DOM Document Object Model
Gmail A free and popular mail service provided by Google
HEIST HTTP Encrypted Information can be Stolen through
TCP-windows
HSTS HTTP Strict Transport Security
HTML Hypertext Markup Language
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IFrame HTML Inline Frame Element
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project
RTT Round-trip time
SVG Scalable Vector Graphics
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
Token A piece of unguessable data
URL Uniform Resource Identifier
VPN Virtual Private Network
W3C World Wide Web Consortium
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet is a massive networking infrastructure that allows millions of
computers to communicate and share resources with each other. World Wide
Web (WWW) is a familiar part of the Internet, which is an information-
sharing model over the Internet. In this model, information is transmitted
and presented in a standardized way. The Web consists of multitude of
information sources which are scattered over various servers in the form of
web sites. This creates the basis for the modern web services, where different
computers can communicate and share resources. The Internet has made
access to information far easier than before and the Internet affects nearly
every aspect of modern life from education and healthcare to business and
government.
Web browser is a crucial part of the modern Internet, where security is
only as strong as its weakest link. End-user web browsers are targeted by a
growing number of attacks. These attacks may tempt attackers to penetrate
through popular websites, not to steal and leak secrets from single server, but
to have a possibility of controlling browsers of the all visitors of the victim
page. This approach makes popular services valuable targets, even if they
themselves do not contain anything valuable as such.
Users have permitted browsers to handle their web usage, including au-
thentication, session handling and page history. In order to make user’s life
simpler, the browser may even collect service passwords and fill them auto-
matically. Those details are valuable information to any hacker that trade
those information dumps for cash in black markets. Details are used for
various activities, including blackmailing, scamming, targeted advertising or
simply using reputation of specific user accounts to order goodies.
After an end-user is lured to a page controlled by an attacker, the attacker
may perform multiple attacks that could lead to total compromise of the
end-user machine. Even if the browser could not be compromised, it is
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common that a single browser instance has active sessions over multiple web
pages simultaneously. Attacker may try to utilize browser to generate actions
over those sites and perform functions on the victim’s behalf. This thesis is
relating to those attacks where web page targets other pages using existing
session of the browser.
One branch of Information Security is web application security that fo-
cuses security of websites, web applications and services. Open Web Ap-
plication Security Project (OWASP) community raises awareness about ap-
plication security and they have published a familiar list of TOP 10 most
important web application security weaknesses. [1]
In addition to this, they maintain a large comprehensive best practice
recommendation cheat sheets of issues that must be taken into account when
securing a web page. They point out that lists are updated regularly because
new flaws are discovered and attack methods sophisticate. They state that
the most cost-effective solution to find and eliminate security weaknesses is
human experts armed with good tools. [2]
This work presents a new cross-origin timing attack method where a ma-
licious page steals sensitive secrets from third-party pages via abusing search
functionality timings of the targeted site. In our demonstrative experiment,
we simulated a mailbox and managed to steal forgot password link from
the mailbox only by luring mailbox victim to follow a site controlled by an
attacker.
We also developed a tool that is used to reveal those timing issues in
practice web applications. We benchmark the tool by revealing how the html
content embedders time distributions behave based on processed payloads.
1.1 Purpose of the study
In order to understand the current situation of web timing attacks, this study
has two major purposes. One to investigate published web timing attacks.
The other is to demonstrate an attack method based on embedded content
retrieving timings.
1.2 Research questions
The research questions of this thesis mainly focus on cross-origin timings
attacks. This thesis seeks answers following research questions:
• How to measure cross-origin timing vulnerabilities in browsers?
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• Depending on the cross-origin target context, which content retrieving
elements are recommendable for more accurate results?
• How a targeted document context affects to a browser load and pro-
cessing time?
• How a timing vulnerability can be advantaged retrieving cross-origin
secrets?
• How altering response time effects the impact of cross-origin search
attack?
1.3 Contribution
This thesis describes general timing attacks and especially cross-site tim-
ing attacks in a browser context. We propose a novel attack method to
steal cross-origin tokens by targeting content embeddees’ timings. We im-
plemented two applications to study this issue in more detail.
The first application is made in order to study cross-origin timing issues
from practical web applications. We introduce this measurement system that
compares any two cross-origin page resources and helps to reveal whether
they leak timings.
In our demonstrative experiment, we use this tool to reveal how the
browser and application timings operate with a different resource contexts.
We identify vectors that are affecting measured timing differences and re-
veal how the different HTML content embedders are seen in terms of time
distribution.
The second application is a implementation of this presented novel attack
method. The application executes this attack in practical environment. In
our demonstrative experiment this application manages to steal arbitrary
token from implemented vulnerable web application.
During carrying out this thesis, we found socket handling security issue
in Mozilla Firefox browser. We build a proof of concept application to make
it more easier for browser developers to locate, test and repair. We reported
this and confirmed that the latest patch resolves the issue. We decided to
include brief details to this thesis and present occurring problem and its
security impact.
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1.4 Structure
The paper is organized as follows. In the following chapter 2 we introduce
background of the web browser environment and describe in what kind of
environment this thesis settles. Chapter 3 describes what timing attacks are,
what different types of timing attacks there are and what relevant research
is published in this area relating to this thesis.
The main part of this work is inside chapter 4. We describe our built
implementations that include measurement tool, search extractor attack tool
and a description of the vulnerability affecting Mozilla Firefox browser.
In chapter 5 we are experimenting our tools. In short, we figure out how
HTML element timings react when targeted resources are altered. We are
also experimenting how cross-site search extractor tool works in a measure-
ment environment.
Chapter 6 covers evaluation of the performed measurements and their
results. In the final chapter we draw our conclusion about the implemented
work, and suggest how the research should be continued.
Chapter 2
Web browser
In order to understand problem domain we introduce a web browser environ-
ment. In particular, we introduce session handling mechanisms and how the
data flows between browser and server. All following chapters are associated
more or less in session management, which is vital to understand following
attacks.
2.1 Web browser
Web browser is a main gateway to access information and capabilities through
web interfaces in a context of online environments. The web browser presents
a chosen web resource by requesting it from the server and displaying it in
the browser window.
The current web is filled up with a huge number of different types of
context and the browser is assumed to translate this information into a pre-
sentable format. Thus, the browser manages over multiple external media
parsers and handles different types of images, videos and for example pdf for-
mats to embedded them in browser context. [3] This exposes a large attack
surface and the browser vendors have to make huge compromises between
security and usability.
The browser main components are user interface, browser and rendering
engine, networking, user interface backend, JavaScript interpreter and Data
storage. Safari, Chrome and Opera use Webkit based rendering engine, In-
ternet Explorer uses Trident, and Firefox uses Gecko. The basic rendering
engine main flow is similar between Gecko and Webkit. [3]
Major browsers are following W3C (World Wide Web Consortium) stan-
dards, which involve standards for building and rendering web pages, includ-
ing technologies such as HTML, CSS, SVG and Ajax [4]. Many security
13
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mechanisms are result of practical experimentations and standardised after
adoption increases [5]. In past, the browsers were not following standards so
thoroughly which caused serious compatibility issues for web authors [3].
ECMAscript, widely known as JavaScript is currently the facto client-side
scripting language. Sites utilize a basic scripting interface called Document
Object Model (DOM ). The DOM allows scripts to dynamically access and
update the content, structure and style of documents. In other words, DOM
is object presentation model of the HTML document and interface for the
JavaScript. [3] The modifications to the DOM, by the user and by scripts
trigger events that developers utilize to build rich user interfaces.
The security of client side web application relies on browser security fea-
tures. Web browser security primitives are document object model (DOM ),
frames, cookies and localStorage, where principals are origins and where in-
teractions are protected using mandatory access control. [5] The resource
location is specified by using Uniform Resource Identifier (URI ). Browser
uses HTTP protocol to get required document, and the HTTP transfers re-
quests over TCP, which finally delivers segments over small IP diagrams.
Firefox is one of the major browsers. Current web browser usage trends
measured by W3Counter (8/2016) reveals that the most used browsers are
Chrome, Safari, Firefox, Internet Explorer & Edge and Opera. Chrome has
the largest market share (58.1%), while the second popular browser is Safari
(12.7%) and Firefox (12.4%), which is fighting for second place. The fourth
is Internet Explorer & Edge with 9.6% market share, and Opera which has
2.8%. [6]
2.2 Client-server protocol
Web browser and server models a client-server computing model. Web browser
builds a requests and the server responds to them based on the requested re-
source. The protocol what the both parties are using for communicating is
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which runs over application layer pro-
tocol in OSI model. Protocol packages are transmitted over Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP), which provides reliable, ordered and error-checked
delivery stream from end-to-end. [7]
A simple request demonstrates a data flow scheme of a request from
browser to a web site www.aalto.fi when performing a search query to a page
as logged-in user:
GET /fi/search/?site_search=all&q=thesis\%20research HTTP/1.1
Host: www.aalto.fi
CHAPTER 2. WEB BROWSER 15
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:51.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/51.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: visid_incap_577306=saHAebChRnSWh1wLNJQ6jB4H2VcAAAAAQUIP
AAAAAAAjYkMVp/719TTuXqICCOn7;incap_ses_108_577306=05ffewKkCX+vX
u7xfbJ/AR4H2VcAAAAAqMR6qz782+z+a/m1xyZ9bA==;incap_ses_276_57730
6=CRm1ZnHWx2oymIvO34zUA2IH2VcAAAAAI4T9gA+GP1PTWlex5LDfvA==;_hjI
ncludedInSample=1;_ga=GA1.2.9074173.1473840993;_dc_gtm_UA-76242
031-1=1;_gat_UA-12300388-1=1; _gat_UA-52497828-1=1; _gat_UA-524
77555-1=1; _gat_UA-52497828-8=1; _gat_UA-52477555-2=1
Connection: keep-alive
Cache-Control: max-age=0
If-Modified-Since: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 12:32:17 GMT
If-None-Match: 2dede8a862b84a53d71ca5322ac8ccfa62293085dcf9fc5d
d96e6dd69999bf66
The request is targeted to the www.aalto.fi server, resolved by the ac-
cording DNS record. The browser includes a request line, and tells that
it is interested about /fi/search/ resource path. In this case, the Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI ) also provides query section, which carries addi-
tional attributes to the performing server. In this case, the section includes
q parameter with a value ’thesis research’. The request includes a cookie,
which for example provides session specific identifiers, so the server may act
according to the user’s access right. The targeted server receives the given
headers and acts.
The response could be for example:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:01:42 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.18
Last-Modified: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 11:52:16 GMT
ETag: ’1aea-5277b3cb5cd82’
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 6890
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<html><head>Search</head><body>... [rest bytes are truncated]
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The response follows the same pattern than the request. The first line
indicates that the response status code is 200 OK, which means the server
found targeted resource. The response contains a content-length header,
which indicates how long the response body is, so the browser knows when
the whole response is received. The response body follows headers and is
separated by a single empty new line. The response body has the actual
document of the response, the browser has requested. The other headers
offer details about the server, and for example details about the response
encoding and media type. [7]
The headers are passing caching information to make efficient updates of
cached information with a minimum amount of transaction overhead. Should
be noted, that all documents are not cacheable, including explicitly marked
ones, and ones that are dynamically generated. [8]
The browser includes a If-Modified-Since and If-None-Match headers.
Those headers tells server, that the browser is already aware of a document
from this resource, but it wants to ensure it is up to date. The server com-
pares the modification time and entity tag to a potential response it has, and
if the content is not changed, the server responds shortly with a status code
304 (Not modified). [8]
2.3 Session handling
In order to understand cross-site request forgery and cross-origin timing at-
tacks the basic knowledge about the browser session handling is required.
The browser supports multiple sessions over various web sites and it is re-
quired to keep those sessions separated and still offer smooth browsing exper-
iment. The following chapter introduces basic concepts of browser’s session,
session isolations and cross-origin policy.
2.3.1 Session
Session is a term used to represent time user spends in a web service. Ses-
sion is required for many basic interactions between web services. In order
to associate a single request to an user the service asks credentials and in
exchange offers a unique session token, which client includes in every request
sent to that specific service. This session token is implemented as cookie
header in HTTP protocol. [2]
The HTTP is stateless protocol, which means that the state must be
maintained somehow between requests to identify user from other users on
the service. For example, when you log in to the web page you don’t have
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to repeat log-in action every time you follow a link to the same service. A
common method to maintain session is a cookie which is included in every
request header that browser is performing. [2]
When the service wants to identify user, it includes a cookie header to the
page response. The browser reads the header and includes it to all subsequent
requests to that service. For this reason, all you have to do is open URL and
cookie is automatically included in every new page requests and filled form
sent as long as cookie stays valid. The cookie session identifier value is
typically strong random character string selected by the server, which is long
and random enough no other user may have a chance to guess it. If they
could guess or predict the token they could easily act out as an original token
user. [2]
The Internet is global network containing millions of sites where single
node could be owned by anyone. Thus, the services may not trust each other
and there must be an method to separate services and avoid exposing cookie
to a malicious service. Acknowledged solution is to isolate service cookies.
2.3.2 Cross-origin policy
The same-origin policy is a security mechanism to isolate documents from
each other by restricting how a document or script loaded from one origin
can interact with a resource from another origin, such as HTTP cookies for
session authentication. The origin is a set of the protocol, port number and
host. If they all match, then the origin is same, and the pages can interact
without origin restrictions. [9] When a document executes an external script,
the browser performs cross-origin request, loads code from third-party page
and executes it using permissions of the caller site.
The interactions are placed in three categories, which are cross-origin
writes, embeddings and reads. Writes are cross-domain interactions includ-
ing links, redirects and form submissions, which are typically allowed. Em-
bedding is allowed, including external JavaScripts, images and iframes. On
the other hand, cross-origin reads are not directly allowed, which means that
in browser context you can not make a page that directly reads a source code
of some cross-origin page using active browser session, without target page
explicitly allowing it. [9]
There are multiple mitigations to that statement. A targeted web service
may relax same-origin policy and selectively permit sources to be shared.
Also, for example, Mozilla developer article states that when you load an
image content, it is possible to read image height and width of the embedded
image. Furthermore, resource status code of the HTTP response is accessible,
thus there are situations where server reveals the existence of the resource.
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[9]
2.3.3 Session isolation
The cookie is tied to the origin of the domain and is included in every request
within the domain-scope. It should be noted, that the service port number
and protocol scheme are not part of the scope. This has a strong security
impact, which does not necessarily come into mind at first. The cookie mech-
anism does not respect same-origin policy similarly like when web browsers
isolate content retrieved via different points. [10]
The set-up causes a potential security issue, because despite that the
cookie is transferred over secure encrypted communication channel HTTPS,
the browser also willingly includes it to any same-domain request. The ses-
sion confidentiality is doomed when the request is sent over insecure channel.
[10] Thus, if an attacker has an ability to observe and modify victim’s web
traffic, they can trick browser to perform resource request to HTTP content
and receive the secret token. Also, the request can be initialized from cross-
origin site, for example using a image element targeting insecure resource.
To mitigate attacks like this, the HTTPS server may narrow down the
cookie scope by introducing attribute named as ’secure’ tied to the session
token. The ’secure’ attribute defines that in addition to previous restrictions
the browser may send the specific cookie only over secure connection. [10]
Now, because an attacker can’t do the man-in-the-middle hijacking of the
HTTPS connection, the cookie stays safe.
There is also an another cookie hardening attribute called as ’httponly’,
which instructs web browser not to expose that specific cookie to the scripts.
Thus, same-origin JavaScript has only write, but no read-access to the cookie
value. This way, the site’s potential same-origin cross-site scripting vulner-
ability has no direct access to the session and it can’t pass it over to the
attacker. In addition, there are cookie attributes to restrict cookie to specific
path or issue cover domain to expand cookie scope to specific subdomains.
[10] Those hardenings are beyond this thesis.
For example, by default, if page https://www.example.com sets a cookie,
the value is attached to the following pages also http://example.com, http://
example.com:8080, https://example.com:8080. The ’secure’ attribute would
deny the cookie to leak to any of those http sites.
2.3.4 Cross-site request forgery
We stated at the previous chapters that the cross-origin writes are allowed.
There are situations where this privilege should be prevented. There are
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sites, that do not recognize whether the write is performed by the site itself,
or by the another cross-origin page. [11]
For example, a web shop has a shopping basket and a basic form flow to
carry out an buy order. Now, it is important, that no cross-origin page may
exploit the trust that a web shop has between user’s browser. Otherwise, a
third-party site could impersonate a user action, which adds an item to the
shopping basket and after launch a buy order in victim’s name.
Cyber-criminals are targeting legitimate websites to inject malicious scripts
that compromise the security of the visitors of such websites. Later, they
perform actions using the visitor’s browser without their permission. Those
actions could be cross-origin writes targeting vulnerable services. In that
case, browser, vulnerable server or even network firewall does not detect that
the request is not made according to the user’s own will and thus, the re-
quests are routed to the target service, even when the attacker has no direct
access to the service.
The cross-origin writes are prevented by including a secret token to all
functionalities, which are meant to be protected against cross-site request
forgery (CSRF ) attacks. The token is similar to the session token, but unlike
the session token, it is included in the URL parameter or as part of the HTTP
POST body parameter, while the session token is transmitted over cookie
value. This way, the token must be included every time to the forms and
requests by the same-origin script, and the receiver server verifies that the
CSRF token is the same original one the server has given before. The token
is random secret token generated by the server and tied to the unique user
session. Third-party pages do not know the token, and thus the cross-origin
writes are denied [11]. Furthermore, the third-party page has no access to
the cookie either but the relating cookie is included automatically to the
requests.
Chapter 3
Timing attacks
In this chapter, we describe what the timing attacks are in the context of a
web browser. In particular, we introduce what cross-site timing attacks are,
and how they differ in the context of other timing attacks. We also note why
building a reliable attack is challenging.
Furthermore, we mention how browser user could mitigate risks and how
service provider should protect against those attacks. After, we expose ex-
isting research about browser web timing attacks. Knowledge of presented
linear comparison attack and resource load timings are later in this thesis
used to build cross-origin search extractor implementation.
3.1 Timing attacks
A timing attack uses statistical analysis of how long it takes your application
to do something in order to learn something about the data it’s operating
on [12]. Timing vulnerabilities are the issues that may still exist even when
proper application hardening is done successfully. Vendors have a difficulties
in finding timing vulnerabilities because they are hard to identify from a code
review perspective and may be found only through testing and experimen-
tation [13]. Majority of the timing attacks exists because of the algorithmic
optimizations, such as ending operation immediately when result is known.
Those timing issues are hard to identify, but they are also hard to fix. Elim-
inating a timing issue typically makes software perform less efficiently. In
other words, fixing a timing vulnerability is a trade-off between privacy and
performance. [14]
Timing attacks are the most well-known type of side channel attacks. An-
other side channel attacks monitor variables like visuals, power consumption
and size of network packets. Timing attack extracts private information by
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issuing certain operations with a purpose of measure time took to perform
those operations [15]. Typically, timing attack give a small bits of informa-
tion, which may be eventually leveraged to a more significant attack. The
timing attack is a different than common invasive attacks, like buffer over-
flows, injections and cross-site scripting attacks that the active attack does
not change the original control flow of the application [16].
Laboratory environment where the timing vulnerabilities are studied should
be thought thoroughly. When a real world environment is simulated in a
simplified testing environment, there is a chance that the final measurements
are biased and the results are not transferable to other environments. The
cross-origin attacks might seem to work very well in the laboratory, but in
practice, it could be common that there are larger jitter or for example more
simultaneous browser pages open, which affect to the measurements enough
to mitigate, or at least make the actual attack more challenging. As within
any timing attack, the attack reliability is highly dependent on the quality
of the gathered timing data.
3.2 Web timing attacks
In a network timing attack, the attacker is targeting web applications and
learning their internal states by launching requests over network. Timing
attacks are effective when targeting local internal application [17], but they
work also over local area network and Internet, even though the additional
network hops increase noise of the measurements.
A random noise variable, known as jitter, absorbs randomness from the
measurement. The measured time consists of a constant clock skew, constant
processing time, propagationTime and jitter. The jitter is eliminated by
using statistical methods and repeated samples. Time resolution an attacker
can observe is a function between how many samples attacker takes and how
large parts of jitter can be efficiently filtered out [18].
In a classic way, web timing attacks are divided into two types, direct
timing attacks and cross-site timing attacks [19]. In a study of Timing At-
tacks in the modern web they introduce a third attack class, which consist
of internal browser timing.
3.2.1 Direct timing attacks
In a direct timing attack the attacker learns private information from the
server state by performing various actions while inspecting the response time
differences. The attacker has direct connection to the targeted server
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A simple direct timing attack is performed for example when an attacker
tries to resolve whether a specific user exists in a target system using timings.
The potential timing difference occurs when attacker logs in as arbitrary user
using arbitrary password. Login implementation verifies that the user exists,
and if and only if the user exists, verifies that the account is not locked or
expired and that the password hash matches to the known one.
In case of invalid user, the server is only required to perform database
query to discover that the user does not exist. In other case, the user exists
and later checks are required. Thus, work amount and thereby processing
time depends on the validity of the tested user name. In practical, database
caching might cause issues if there is a hit and request is queried more than
once.
One of the most famous direct timing attack is introduced by Brumley and
Boneh. They introduced a practical remote timing attack against OpenSSL
that is wide use in web servers to secure communications against eavesdrop-
ping. Their practical attack managed to extract 1024-bit RSA private key
over local area network stored on the Apache web server. The attack execu-
tion took about two hours and a million queries. In a result, they concluded
that 1 millisecond variance is measurable over local area network. Besides
the Apache, they found similar timing issues from the libgcrypt library used
in GNUTLS and GPG security libraries. [18]
Later, study of Crosby focused to examine time resolution more closely.
In their simulated case, the attacker using some knowledge about the mea-
sured environment, they were able to reliably distinguish a processing time
differences as low as 200 nanoseconds over local network with false negative
and false positive rates under five percent. Over Internet, they managed to
measure 30 microsecond difference within 1000 measurements. [18]
For local measurements and hardware-near measurements central limit
theorem applies, which says that after you measure enough times a number
of independent random values, then the resulting dataset will be normally
distributed. Crosby study underline that the network timing measurements
are not normally distributed, and for accurate measurements, the median,
average and minimum values should not be used for getting most reliable
data. They suggest to filter non-gaussian distributions using low-percentile
filters, which exhibit significantly less noise. Study also suggest that when
comparing whether two sets of messages had the same response time those
filters should be used [18].
Mona-timing-lib [20] is a simple python library to measure time taken
from request to response. Furthermore, mona-timing-report [21] application
generates statistical model from taken measurements.
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3.2.2 Cross-site timing attacks
In a cross-site timing attack we have no direct access to the measured ap-
plication. The attack is indirectly performed in a victim’s browser against
a targeted web service. In this way, we abuse a trust between a victim’s
browser and the targeted service. Requests sent by the victim are authen-
ticated and actions are executed in a state the victim has in the targeted
website. [14]
Cross-site timing attack imitates a cross-site request forgery (CSRF ),
where victim’s browser is triggered to perform cross-site requests over third-
party-service without the victim’s knowledge. However, cross-site timing
attack is not targeting cross-origin page writes. It is targeting cross-origin
write timings and is thus a bit more complex. [14] In a classic way, the
time measurement includes data handshakes, transmission, and processing
time in both server and client side, and rendering time in the browser side.
It would grow up the attack surface when all those timing factors could be
measured individually but in many cases, the browser does not offer direct
interfaces to give those details. The leaked information can be relayed back
to the attacker. Like in any timing attack, caching and other optimizations
in the processed paths affects to the browsing performance and thus most
likely are leaking timing information about the processed tasks, especially
when speaking about effective page caching mechanisms.
In a related research chapter we introduce some known attacks, but in
short, timing attacks poses an imminent threat to a online privacy of the
users. To name a few, they provide methods to discover browser owner’s
partial browsing history, personal information, including age, location and
interests of a user [15].
3.2.3 Browser-based timing attacks
In addition to the attacks targeting to the server side timings, browser-based
timing attacks are targeting how long the browser process resources inter-
nally. Timing starts instantly after resource has been downloaded, and stops
after the resource has been processed, which may include caching, parsing
and rendering operations. The attack targets internal browser mechanisms
that are not relying on the unstable networking. Also, it is much faster to
perform multiple internal measures than launch hundreds of requests to an
external service [15].
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3.2.4 Threat model
General cross-site timing attack threat model has an attacker that controls a
web server and hosts a malicious site. The attacker lures victim to his page
by using social engineering or by compromising some third party site used
by the victim. The attacker run javascript code in the victim’s browser, but
can’t bypass the same-origin policy directly. The timing attack is utilized
and the attack takes as long as the victim keeps the malicious site open.
Otherwise, the browser is expected to disconnect any sockets related to the
session and close any scripts running in the background.
3.2.5 Timing challenges
The cross-site timing attack is performed in the victim’s browser against
known third-party service. Victim’s environment has multiple factors that
are making reliable attack challenging. Environmental variables changes,
such as, operating system, the browser product and version, browser exten-
sions, network performance, cache aggregates, round-trip time (RTT) and
various network connection features, including latency, jitter, network con-
gestion and packet dropping stability. There are also challenges that are
familiar from the direct timing attacks, including server error factors like
constantly changing server loads and internal background tasks that con-
sume capacity and delay the response. [15]
An attacker may manage to overcome various timing challenges by launch-
ing multiple measurements and apply statistical methods. However, the at-
tack time frame is often short and redoing measurements cause loss of time
available and may undermine the success of the attack. Furthermore, con-
stantly repeated requests may trigger server defence mechanisms and con-
nection attempts end up as blocked state. [15]
In addition to timing errors, a targeted feature is often not directly mea-
surable by provided browser API and attacker may have to find circuitous
paths to make required measurements. For example, the server processing
time leaks information about the complexity of the asked resource. Obvi-
ously, we have no direct API to measure server delay. We can’t even measure
latency to the server like ping command does.
Fortunately for attackers, many features could be measured in a different
manner, for example to measure ping we could check current time, build a
request that requires server to use minimum amount of resources to send back
a short message and later check time again and calculate timing difference.
This measurement is actually known as HTTP latency that may be used to
eliminate jitter from the transmissions. Furthermore, if the HTTP latency
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is minor or stable enough we can measure server processing time by issuing
various operations to the server and measure how long the operations took.
In practical part of this thesis, we introduce an attack utilizing this kind of
leakage.
At least Firefox has Navigation Timing API that has large number of
measurable events including domain lookup, request loading and DOM pars-
ing. However, the interface respects same origin policy which can be broad-
ened by including time-allow-origin header in response. [22] Attacker has no
ability to set that header, and thus has to use different methods to perform
measurements. One way is to start a timer, include cross-origin resource to
the DOM, wait until browser loads content and rises onload callback to stop
the timer.
3.2.6 Mitigate timing attacks
Web user has many defense methods available for mitigating against cross-
origin attacks. At first, most simple way is to mitigate risks is creating
separate containers for different kind of sites. This is achieved by running
multiple browsers, using private windows, or multiple profiles side-by-side,
that are using different completely separated cookie jars. For example, Fire-
fox has containers feature, which enables users to use multiple sessions on
same site simultaneously. This gives ability to segregate site data for im-
proved privacy and security. Furthermore, we recommend terminating web
page session after it is not required anymore.
Secondly, browser third-party cookies should be disabled. This would
drop cookies from the requests that are sent to the cross-origin targets.
Those requests would be performed as unauthenticated user and thus result-
ing timings would not reveal targeted user web application state. Disabling
third-party cookies would also prevent other cross-site attacks for very simi-
lar reason. Major browsers, including Firefox supports disabling third-party
cookies but they are not disabled as default, because of potential compati-
bility issues within existing sites.
Thirdly, page cache should respect same-origin policy. However, blocking
cross-origin cache usage would issue more than 50 % performance overhead
among Alexa Top 100 websites [23]. No mainstream browser has adopted
defenses against cache issues.
Web service providers should not trust that every user protects their
sessions. Fortunately, many server side solutions against cross-origin timing
attacks has been proposed. At first, service provider should utilize basic
CSRF protection that prevents third-party pages from generating requests
to their content. The CSRF token is introduced in more detail in session
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handling chapter. The protection has restraints, but we recommend this
option. We return to this protection in the Limitations chapter of the Cross-
Site Search Extractor implementation section.
Secondly, Sebastian Schinzel introduced an effective defence mechanism
against direct login timing attacks where the main concept is that the given
input, for example user name is salted, hashed, and later casted to bounded
integer. The response is then delayed by the amount of that integer. This
way, all queries, regardless of their actual status have unique delay and timing
comparison could not be done. [24] It should be noted, that simple random
delays without any logics are neither effective, nor an efficient mitigation for
timing attacks. The random delay brings only a little more noise, which are
efficiently filtered out using statistical methods. [25] It should be noted, that
the same statistical methods works when some of the user input does not
alter the performed action time but changes the hash and delay.
Thirdly, a mitigation method is to ensure that all inputs given to the
implementation takes the same amount of time. The execution time is mea-
sured and remaining fixed time is added as delay at end of the execution. [14]
However, this is ineffective and in most implementations impractical.
3.3 Related attacks
In this section we discuss some related research about the effects of timing
attacks on browser security. We introduce what kind of cross-site and internal
browser timing vulnerabilities there have been and what kind of attacks they
provides. Also, we introduce a linear comparison vulnerability method that
is applied and exploited in the cross-site search extractor implementation.
3.3.1 Traditional cache-based timing attacks
Browser cache-based timing-attacks take advantage of time difference re-
quired to load external resource. Caching purpose is to make access to vis-
ited files faster. Due to the cache properties cache hit is available a lot faster
than cache miss where resource is loaded from the net. This side-channel ex-
poses whether victim has ever loaded URL before. The attack could target
any URL that offer static file that browser is willingly to cache and measure
whether the are already in cache. [15]
It is possible to load static content as an iframe and measure the loading
time. The same measurement can be accomplished using external stylesheets,
scripts, images and any other html entity, which perform cross-domain re-
quest while leaking the response time. The caching content may be exposed
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by loading targeted resource twice, and if the response times differ less than
threshold, the content was part of the cache. The issue has been known
more than 15 years but the fix is not easy because the caching is part of the
browser design. [15]
In the end of 2015 Yan Zhu released Sniﬄy attack tool that reveals
browser history by loading bunch of http services, which support HTTP
Strict Transport Security (HSTS ) and time how long it takes for browser to
be redirected from HTTP to HTTPS. Based on that, Sniﬄy decides whether
the browser has seen the domain before and is thus previously known HSTS
domain. Content Security Policy (CSP) directive trick filters targeted fav-
icon images to HTTP content, which would in context of HSTS otherwise
redirected automatically to relevant HTTPS site. [26]
The Sniﬄy listens how long the load process took, and if the amount is
in order of a millisecond the network had no chance to perform request and
receive response so fast, which means it was cached HSTS redirect. The
cache hit indicates that the user has visited a page before. Because of shared
HSTS cache, the attack works over incognito session and even reveals a
subset of sites user has visited in non-incognito session. For successful attack
the vulnerable pages must have HSTS security header enabled. [26]
3.3.2 Rendering timing attacks
In the past, it was possible to perform simple JavaScript check whether
user has visited an URL by calling Window.getComputedStyle [27] method,
which gives values of all applied stylesheet properties and basic computations
it may contain. The method reveals directly whether the link had visited or
unvisited styles. This was a huge privacy issue because any website could ask
if exact URL is in the user’s browsing history. Curious site could scan a large
number of pages and resolve part of the browsing history. By experimenting,
it became clear that a common browser could perform more than 200k URL
checks in a minute. [28]
At the beginning, the browser developers did not see threat a sufficiently
enough and for example, Mozilla had 10 year old bug record discussion about
the issue, left unfixed. However, afterwards the impact was seen more evi-
dent. The original attack scenario of the history stealing was to figure out
your online personal banking site and perform corresponding phishing site.
The real impact become clear later, when history stealing attacks were com-
bined with a knowledge of social network web applications. [29]
Research managed to deanonymize user identities based on their social
network habits. In attack, a malicious site enumerates social media profile
pages with different id values. Attack targets social media pages, that are
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very likely visited only by the profile page owner. For example, resource
editprofile?id=1338, and when the visited hit occurs it is pretty clear that the
user identity has been revealed. It would be very unlikely that the other users
would have any browsing hits to a edit feature of a profile page other than his
own. Their public experiment de-anonymized 10k targeted volunteers and
correctly identified 1.2k users, meaning 12% overall success rate, and they
found traces about 3.7k users. [29]
As their presentation reveals, the practical attack requires optimizations,
because social media sites are having too large user space. The attack is
optimized by enumerating social groups rather than users. Finding a visited
groups in the history indicates a membership, and by listing group members
and figuring out intersected group users it was effective to test user candidates
and reveal victim. [29] The vulnerable method were fixed in 2010 by reducing
access to style properties, and by ensuring that Javascript API calls behave
always like a link is unvisited [13].
3.3.2.1 History stealing via render timings
In July 2013, Paul Stone published a Pixel Perfect Timing Attacks with
HTML5 writeup. The research found that a timing attacks could be used
efficiently for sniffing browser history. The rendering timing based history
sniffer was demonstrated to perform 13 to 20 URL checks per second. [13]
The pixel perfect timing attack brings a single URL one by one to a site
and searches for a browser redraw event. The Firefox performs an asyn-
chronous database lookup from history database for each link and decorates
the style to match a ’visited’ or ’unvisited’ state. The unvisited style is used
as default and later when lookup finishes as positive, the style is redrawn to
visited state. [13]
Detecting a redrawn event is seen by using window.requestAnimationFrame
API [30] that introduces a browser to call a specified function to update an
animation instantly before a new repaint occurs. Using this method, they
managed to measure time difference between callbacks and detect repaints.
However, rendering state for a visited style is a short operation, which could
not be measured reliably. [13]
To make those rendering repaints more detectable they managed to slow
down process by introducing complex styles to the visited fonts and include
for example expensive text-shadow effects with large blur-radius. To make
attack more efficient, the the rendering delay should be observable but as
small as possible. [13]
Target browsers have inconsistent performances, thus the research sug-
gest to run calibration stage and find optimal values before running actual
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measurements. They also bring up the idea to improve performance by in-
troducing multiple different URLs at the same time to the browser, and if
the detection happens then that item could be found using binary search.
[13]
3.3.2.2 Pixel Perfect Timing Attack
The same Pixel Perfect write up published an another timing issue that
relates to SVG filters. The research found an issue that the complex visual
effects can be applied to the cross-domain content. Those effects could be
done so challenging that rendering time could be made to leak information
about single pixels they are operating. Issue can be applied to any cross-
domain content including images and HTML content, where single pixels are
measurable. This is browser based issue, because same-origin policy should
prevent any read access to cross-domain content. [13]
Furthermore, they tricked browser to show source code of cross-origin
page and managed to target view to a single source line using fragment
identifier with specific line number. Also, they managed to perform optical
character recognition (OCR) over the source code. In general, when the font
is known, a text from a character set of size N can be read a character by
testing only log2N pixels, which even more accelerated reading speed. For
example, if there are 16 characters, then only four pixels are required for each
letter. As a result, by reading pixelated cross-origin document sources, they
managed to steal generic user identifiers and sensitive session tokens. [13]
3.3.3 Geo-inference cache timing attacks
Another study reveals that malicious site could sniff location-sensitive re-
sources left by the location-oriented sites. The location resources are not
exposed directly but they are static map media files that are included in
browser caching and can be exposed similar way as browser cache sniffing.
[31]
Researchers managed to localize volunteers using time-based cache sniff-
ing against location-oriented sites. No any other details, including GPS or
IP address were used. They noticed, that many sites are geo-targeted. Their
study reveals that 62% of Alexa Top 100 websites contain location-sensitive
resources. For example, at country level, Google has 191 geography-specific
domains and user is redirected to local one. [31]
They managed to expose victim’s country by enumerating all Google’s
logo images from their different domains. After knowing the country, the
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exact city was found advantaging popular sites offering city-specific pages,
for example service Craigslist. It is used to sell and buy local items. [31]
Furthermore, they extend study to online map services. They discover,
that Google Maps has tile based map engine, and the map is divided into
a huge number of small static image tiles. In addition, at default, Google
Maps zooms into the user’s current location. Thus, browser cache sniffing
reveals recently visited areas. Therefore, finding visited tiles most likely
reveals neighborhood of the user. [31]
3.3.4 HTTP Encrypted Information Stolen through TCP-
windows
A research exploited combined flaws in browser and in underlying network
protocols. They managed to reveal exact byte count of any cross-origin re-
sponse and use this leakage to steal cross-site session tokens. This HTTP En-
crypted Information Stolen through TCP-windows (HEIST) brings network-
level attacks to the browser. [32]
They advantaged a new browser feature, Service Workers. Especially
its interface Fetch API, which performs arbitrary network requests similarly
like more commonly known XMLHttpRequest interface. Fetch is native im-
plementation for performing XMLHttpRequests against a server. In this tim-
ing research context, the most important difference is that fetch launches a
callback event instantly after first byte of the response is received and in ad-
dition, a next after whole response is received. Thus, while other APIs could
measure only a moment after the whole response is received. This fetch ex-
pands measurable cross-origin time scale. By timing first and last byte, they
learn that the difference exposes whether the bytes were encapsulated in the
same TCP segment, which in most systems is approximately 14kB. [32]
They figured out, that if the web service has simple feature that echoes
controlled parameter back to the user. It is possible to grow that parame-
ter in a controlled manner, and with knowledge about TCP flow and TCP
congestion window, they managed to recognize TCP segment split moment,
and thus succeed to find out original byte count. [32]
They also suggest that HEIST could be used to take advantage of CRIME
attack, which leverages compression rate of HTTPS responses to extrapolate
secret messages from the responses. The original CRIME attack requires an
active man-in-the-middle node, while this HEIST could be performed only
by luring victim to malicious site. [32]
Now, when the service compress the response, the attacker sees the amount
of bytes transmitted, in a compressed form. By testing different parameter
CHAPTER 3. TIMING ATTACKS 31
payloads, the attacker learns how efficiently each payload is compressed. Bet-
ter compression ratio indicates that the iterated payload is included in the
response more than once. By this assumption, they could abuse cross-origin
restrictions and find out cross-origin session secrets. [32]
3.3.5 Linear comparison vulnerability
A common comparison timing vulnerability exists in many major program-
ming languages. When the string is compared to another, a simple default
compare function utilizes break-on-inequality algorithm. Thus, a byte array
that shares no immediate prefix terminates instantly. Array that has only
the first 15 bytes of the common prefix breaks after 16th comparison opera-
tion, instantly after the first unequal byte. Each comparison consumes time,
short, but measurable time. Thus, there is a timing attack on the string
comparison [12].
A linear comparison vulnerability in password authentication is a fatal
security issue in any local and low-response network. The reason is, that the
attacker may first guess deterministically following passwords: aaaaaaaa,
baaaaaaa, caaaaaaa, daaaaaaa, and so on and chose the password candidate
that took longest time to process. The attacker then knows the first character
of the right password, and moves to the second character. For example, if the
correct password begins with letter d, and it has been correctly recognized,
the following guesses would be daaaaaaa,dbaaaaaa,dcaaaaaa, and so on. Step
by step, and letter by letter the password leaks to the attacker and she may
pass the authentication state and continue to the service.
Nowadays, most services are not saving passwords as plaintext anymore,
and each of them are at least converted to a result of a strong cryptographic
hash function and to authenticate a user, the password given by the user is
hashed and compared to the stored hashed version. This way, if the server is
in some day compromised, the password has a bit more protection, because
the secure one-way hash function has no ability to convert password back to
plain text. The attacker must attempt to hash every password combination
and generate their hash values to figure out a matching password. [12]
In general, hash functions have no data-dependent timing issues. How-
ever, if the hash values are compared using linear comparison as before, the
outcome is vulnerable, again. The attacker must guess the hash prefix step
by step instead of the password prefix. The strong cryptographic hash func-
tion makes the attack to take longer, but still, the online guessing work can
be transformed to a magnitude faster oﬄine attack. To reduce the amount
of oﬄine load, the attacker may filter a password candidates from a large
word lists and test only the most promising ones instead of generating all
CHAPTER 3. TIMING ATTACKS 32
character permutations.
In the middle of the 2013, the pseudonym aj-code published a tool Timing-
IntrusionTool5000. He states that with a certain compare functions a more
correct password takes longer to compare than a less correct password. In
his measurements, the single letter difference is in the order of 5 to 100 ns.
By taking multiple measurements and filtering out jitter outliers by the 10th
percentile rule he manages to reveal password of simple Python Socket Server
that reads a password from the network, compares it to the hard coded pass-
word and responds with true or false. In a less than 10 minutes, he manages
to resolve eight character plaintext password using 673506 measurements in
total over 100Mbit local network. [33]
The published implementation does not manage to perform attack over
remote web app, but the author believes that the concept outperforms a
simple brute force attack over Internet and that the issue exists even after
the real world exploiting it is hard. [33] Real world attacks are mitigated by
following security recommendations to use account specific unique password
salts and prevent login attempts after enough guesses.
3.3.6 Cross-site search attack
The study advantaged search timing side-channel attack. The attack abuses
search functionality, which leaks sensitive cross-domain information via tim-
ings. They abused cross-origin search features and found out that many
sites leak sensitive information about current site state, including user’s con-
tact names, email contents, relationships, search history and other personal
structured information. [34]
They succeed to perform boolean queries against Gmail and Bing ac-
counts and managed to reveal whether victim’s web mail has specific phrases
in email messages and whether email relates to particular sender. Also, they
managed to reveal victim’s first and last name, with 90% success rate. The
attack utilized advanced search features and measured the differences in re-
sponse times depending on the hits of the result. [34]
Sites usually protect sensitive state-changing cross-origin requests by ver-
ifying CSRF token validity. However, it is common that requests that do
not change state are not cross-origin protected, which is true for at least
with search functions. In this cross-site search attack, called as XS-search,
attacker’s goal is to detect whether a specific search word has results or not
in victim’s browser targeted to a specific web application. The attack iter-
ates over studied wordlist and reveals words that are included in the targeted
context. [34]
They encounter issues including noise, small sample size and inaccurate
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measurements. Large scale of tools were built to deal with the challenges.
They evaluated several XS-search optimized statistical tests, response-inflate
and compute-inflate mechanisms, and divide and conquer algorithms. [34]
3.3.7 Resource load timings
In a study researchers experimented how the different html element embed-
ders are affecting to the measured load time of arbitrary content, when their
actual outcome is ignored. They figured out, that cross-origin response sizes
are measurable. [15]
In a most classic way, the browser is instructed to embed cross-origin
image resource and measure the amount the load operation takes. The mea-
surement works against any content, even when the target resource is not ex-
pected image, because the file is completely loaded before the parser notices
the incompatible format. The research states that less than 15kB difference
is not measurable in a classic way. [15]
They found out, that the HTML5 introduces<audio>and <video>element
embedders, which issue an event instantly after actual content is downloaded,
and afterwards when the content is parsed. They noticed that in video el-
ement, a larger document takes more time to parse, and the parse timings
are less distributed (have a smaller standard deviation) than in a case of
resource download time. Using this knowledge, the network connection and
server jitter could be left out from the measurement time and thus perform
more accurate timings. They found, that especially for resources with a
small difference the browser-based attacks offer much accurate timings than
network based measurements. [15]
Another finding they made, was that attacker can force an external re-
source to be cached in a context of his attack site. They figured out that
writing and reading oﬄine cache is measurable and results depend on the
content size. By performing those operations multiple times, they could es-
timate the size of the accessed file. In their results, time required to perform
AppCache-based timing attack with 95% accuracy to detect 25kB difference
took less than 2.5 seconds in various environments. [15]
As proof of concept, they published an online browser-based timing attack
page, which determines your login status to Facebook, your Facebook gender
and political preference based on Twitter followers. They used described
observations to perform those tricks. For example, to reveal gender, they
published two pages in Facebook, where one was limited to male readers,
and another to females. Both messages were huge, which caused that based
on the gender, the response sizes were either 110 kB or 40 kB. Observing the
timing difference they managed to deduce the gender. [15]
Chapter 4
Tools for timing attacks
In this chapter, we introduce built tools in more detail. At first, we are
going through measurement tool, which is used to find cross-origin timing
vulnerabilities. The measurement tool is a web page which is run in a browser
like any other web page. The page generates requests to the targeted service
which later responds and leaks timings. Those timing leakages are based
on the combination of vulnerabilities in both the browser and the target
application.
The second implemented tool is also a web page and starts exactly where
the first one left. The tool advantages timing leakages and performs an
actual attack targeting vulnerable cross-origin search page. We present how
the implementation works and especially how it recovers from time to time
occurring faulty measurements. We briefly remark some issues, which rise
up during testing and building the implementation.
Later in this chapter we introduce previously unknown security bug in
Firefox’s implementation, relating how the browser fails to handle specific
connection sockets properly, and how it affects as an security impact. We
expose how the vulnerability could be exploited.
4.1 Load time measurements
We made a tool to find and inspect cross-origin timing attack to circumvent
same-origin policy. The key factor is to run Javascript on victim’s browser
and using Javascript to perform cross-origin requests and recognize whether
two cross-domain payloaded requests differs in context. This knowledge could
then be exploited further as is shown in the following search extractor exper-
iment.
We built a web page measurement tool that is used to reveal whether
34
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two targeted cross-origin page contents are similar to each other. Browsers
do have a same-origin policy security feature, which should prevent this kind
of information leaks. However, the tool abuses request timing side channels,
which in specific scenarios seem to reveal more than enough information for
a practical attack.
There are many logical reasons why timings are leaking information in
a general application. For example, a private mailbox web service could
have a search form to query content from user’s private mails. When a
browser issues a query, the server might take a bit longer when the search
finds content. That is, because server might run a different code path and
perform multiple extra database queries to provide more detailed answer.
Furthermore, when a hit is found, the response size extends and transmission
time takes longer. Also, in that case, the browser must render a bit more
complex page, including potential related hyperlinks, thumbnails and other
context.
The introduced measurement tool enables us, as security auditors, to
understand request timing issues in practical context and expose what are the
indicative content boundaries that are at least vulnerable. At this moment,
we are not clear how small content differences are measurable. Also, we are
not aware that the industry has any public tools to measure those cross-origin
timings and very likely there are web pages vulnerable to this issue. This
implementation helps us to reveal those issues and keeps us more protected
in the future.
In order to measure cross-origin response similarities we are comparing
two pages in a same application. Timing variables are highly dependent
that the targeted application is same. Thus, we can point out whether two
pages differ in the same application, but we cannot measure if two different
application pages are similar. In this context, the similarity is measured upon
the difference of content bytes, difference in the amount of inner dependencies
(subrequests) and in the time the server took to build the response.
Browser processes payloads differently based on the html element, which
issues the cross-origin request. For example, timing leakage may be exposed
by using iframe tag, but while using script tag the issue does not exist. Thus,
the chosen element affects to the result and to make comprehensive tests there
are a multiple elements to study. Based on W3.org [35], the following html
elements embeds content: img, iframe, embed, object, param, video, audio,
source, track, map and area.
In general, we are interested in any accessible details; variables and fea-
tures that specific element offers and thus provides additional surface for com-
paring payload responses. This includes event handlers, progress events [36],
attributes, timings and functions. Many features are behind the same-origin
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policy and could not be touched behind the cross-origin request, including
progress event that has trigger for loadstart, progress, error, abort, load and
loadend events. In this thesis, we focus here on timing issues related to
element callbacks.
In attacker’s viewpoint, we cannot alter the server code, or configure
cache settings of the browser. However, we may avoid some browser caching
mechanisms by changing a requested address a bit, so that the browser and
server thinks a request is a fresh one. Instead, the targeted resource is exactly
same, except a randomized parameter at end of the URL that does not affect
to the server response but removes potential page caching. Every requested
address is unique, thus the browser cache makes a miss.
In our measurement tool, we are measuring payloads one at a time, and
comparing two payloads in turns. When measuring two different payload
sets, the naive timing measurement approach would run two payload sets
separately and compare the sets of timing afterwards. However, we parallel
measurements to perform them in turn and run compared payloads close to
each other, which leads to a better results. That is, because the momentary
network conditions are more similar to each other when those measurements
are run between a short time frame. For example, the jitter is approximately
same and thus, the results are more precise [16]. Also, the first few dozen
measurements should be skipped to avoid TCP negotiation and cache level
warm-up outliers. In the following measurements, we are not filtering warm-
up outliers out. We assume that the sample size is high enough to filter out
any outliers.
4.1.1 Implementation
We developed a system that inspects cross-origin request load timings in a
browser context. Our tool measures embedded content elements timing be-
haviour when they imports another cross-origin resources into the document.
Those elements are used to include cross-origin documents and measure how
long the operation took. Each element aims to different purpose in browser
context, but we are interested how they adapt to our timing research.
Our measurement tool gathers two target address from the user and then
utilizes same basic concept the W3C Candidate has introduced, which is a
simple attempt [37] to measure time it takes to fetch a single resource. When
we perform a measurement, we check current time, introduce a new cross-
origin element and assign onload callback to measure time difference. The
browser scheduler issues request almost instantly, which enables measuring
accurate processing time.
We prefer to perform compared requests close to each other to adapt
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Element Description
img Represents an image
iframe Represents a nested browsing context
embed Provides an integration point for an external non-HTML application
object Represents an external resource based on its type
video Used for playing videos or movies, and audio files with captions
audio Represents a sound or audio stream
script Allows authors to include dynamic script and data blocks in their documents
Table 4.1: Element embeddors
better against environmental changes. If a single measurement performs
slower than before, it is likely that the downwarding impact affects to the
second measurement also. For example, a Windows update could issue heavy
packet transmissions that constrict the available bandwidth capacity and
influences to the measurements.
The measurements are performed using element callbacks, thus the main
loop of the measurement tool is implemented so that the callback initial-
izes a new measurement from the shuﬄed work queue. In every row, the
implementation shuﬄes execution order of the elements to avoid potential
strange caching errors, which may otherwise recur in every iteration. In our
implementation, the performance.now() method is used instead of a bit more
inaccurate new Date().getTime() method, which is introduced by W3C. We
chose seven elements for our basis. The chosen elements are listed in Ta-
ble 4.1. We introduce a couple of those mentioned elements in more detail
because of their special properties.
Iframe [35] provides a way to embed another cross-domain site within
the current HTML document. The outer document does not have access to
inner document DOM, but iframe offers onerror and onload triggers to give
feedback about the success of the load. Onload of the iframe fires after all
iframe content and sub content are done loading. This includes, that the
server has generated response, transmitted it to the browser, and browser
has constructed a new DOM tree and loaded all inner dependence elements
and rendered response to the screen [35]. Thus, iframe loading time changes
significantly depending on the content that may have a large set of external
dependencies.
Script and img element requests should be a lot faster to process than
iframe, because there is only one element that needs to be retrieved. There-
fore, this is a lot more robust way to measure server processing time than
iframe. The same thing affects to the fetch, which should also trigger in-
stantly. Also, a study states that the video element processing time depends
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Iframe Img ...
URL1 URL2 onerror ononload URL1 ...
a b a-b ...
c d c-d
e f e -f
Table 4.2: Matrix representation
about the content amount, even when the content is not in expected media
format [15].
In addition to mentioned elements, we measure parsing time using fetch
content downloader and it is included in the results like it would be an
element. It measures how long the browser parses. This is possible, because
fetch triggers a callback as soon as the first byte is received from the server.
Later, polling performance.getEntries() it is possible to measure when the
last byte is received. The same trick is used as part of the the HEIST attack.
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that W3C introduce performanceRe-
sourceTiming interface that allows Javascript mechanisms to provide com-
plete client side measurements, but that is only accessible on the same-origin
requests and thus is not relevant to our study.
4.1.2 Representation
We perform measurements by launching a single request to both URLs iter-
ating over every individual html embedder. The response timings are written
to the matrix view, where first column has the total time of the request for
that specific element for URL1, and the second column same thing for URL2.
The third and fourth columns shows the times separated based on the issued
callback. URL1 time value is put to the raised callback column and same
thing with the URL2, but here the value is treated as negative value. When
callbacks collide the first URL1 time is subtracted by time of the URL2.
If only a URL2 time is written to a specific column, it is negative. Next
columns repeats the introduced scheme for the rest of the element types.
Each row represent a new measurement.
In the end, this results a matrix view respecting the scheme shown in
Table 4.2. Using this representation, every callback column represents a
measured feature, and if any those callback columns have a large percentage
of positive, or negative numbers, then the response is likely vulnerable. That
happens, when tested element is calling different callbacks, or the actual time
measurement reveals issue. We know, that this kind of representation does
not provide a strong statistical view and more development should be done to
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Event handler Description
onerror Triggered if an error occurs while loading an external file
onload Occurs when an object has been loaded
Table 4.3: Callbacks
analyze results more thoroughly. However, current version reveals certainly
vulnerable issues and indicates about potential cases.
To summarize, we measure timings and search for a clue that the mea-
sured payload affects to the timings. Afterwards, when the issue is found, we
may build actual attack and abuse the leakage. We believe, that there are a
large number of pages that are vulnerable to this timing attack.
4.1.3 Leaking callbacks
In that measurement representation model, in addition to looking timings,
we compare triggered callbacks. We catch callback element calls and try
to identify responses from each other without potential unstable time mea-
surements. We are interested about onerror, and onload events and in this
context, the callback is either onload or onerror. Those events are listed in
Table 4.3.
In future, there might be more callbacks we are interested. W3C state
that every HTML element must support onblur, onerror, onfocus, onload,
onresize and onscroll event handlers, and their specific event handler event
types [38].
In general, the onload [39] event triggers when an external document is
loaded, parsed and presented properly. Otherwise, onerror event is triggered.
Onerror is triggered when the content is not reachable (indicated with 404 -
not found status code), or in a supported format, or is malformed. The W3C
specification does not cover precisely, which are the exact scenarios when the
onload and onerror should be raised and thus the browsers are not working
consistent with this case [40]. For example, when loading external document,
should an empty response be classified as onload or onerror event?
A social network service is vulnerable and leaks user login status when
profile image is served normally for logged-in user and otherwise not found
error is raised. Advertising page could perform a simple check and bring
like-button ads more visible when user is known to have active Facebook
session.
That status code leakage is server side implementation or configuration
issue and should be fixed. The status code catcher is robust, takes a small
effort to implement and there are no similar challenges that occurs with
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timings. However, there are a lot of pages which do not have status code
leakage issues, but are affected to timing attacks.
4.2 Cross-site search extractor
In previous section, we introduced a tool that digs timing differences from
targeted web applications. In this section, we introduce an another tool,
which is made as a proof of concept to take over found timing leakages and
make them to a practical attack. The purpose of this tool is to extract data
from targeted web application in a way that the author of the page and/or
browser has not been taken into account.
We introduce a cross-site search extractor attack, where secret cross-origin
sentences are stolen by studying resource load timings. The concept is to take
advantage of web page search functionality and by issuing boolean queries
character by character construct a cross-origin secret tokens. The attack
reminds cross-site search attack, which reveals whether some chosen exact
keyword exists in a vulnerable service. This is introduced more specifically
on the related research chapter
Our attack is not limited to a wordlist, the attack is able to construct
words and sentences without previous knowledge about their actual context.
We construct those secrets by using similar concept a linear comparison at-
tack utilizes. Thus, the known cross-site search attack is made more lethal
by combining these known attacks together. We call this attack as cross-site
search extractor, to avoid confusion to the simpler wordlist based attack.
It should be noted, that in this case, significant time difference does not
occur because of the optimized compare function that uses before mentioned
vulnerable break-after first inequality method. The timing difference is sig-
nificant, because the payloads are for example running different code paths
and issuing different amount of database queries. This is described in more
detail in load time measurements chapter.
The following fictitious example puts our attack in a practical context. A
victim has a web mailbox which includes a powerful search engine. Victim
receives email containing link to a site that promises cute premium rating
cat pictures. The victim follows unique link to the attacker’s page and surfs
those photos. In the meanwhile, attacker recognizes that the unique token
is loaded and resolves the victim’s email address. After the email is known,
the attacker launches a forgot password query to all popular sites using the
victim’s details.
The mailbox fills up with the password reset URLs including the secret
authentication tokens. The attacker continues the attack as long as the user
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stays on the page, or until the attack success. For example, victim receives
following email:
Dear user , someone r e c e n t l y reques ted a password change
f o r your account . I f you don ’ t want to change your
password or didn ’ t r eque s t th i s , j u s t i gno re and
d e l e t e t h i s message .
I f t h i s was you , you can s e t a new password here :
https : // example . com/ r e s e t ? token=d7a8fbb307d7809469ca9a
bcb0082e4f8d5651e46d3cdb762d02d0bf37c9e592
To keep your account secure , p l e a s e don ’ t forward t h i s
emai l to anyone . See our Help Center f o r more
s e c u r i t y t i p s . Thanks !
The attacker attempts to resolve those secret tokens and thereby steal
valuable user accounts. The attacker has no direct access to the secret token.
However, he is able to run javascript code on victim’s browser that is known
to have active session to the targeted webmail.
Attacker exploits cross-site search attack against search functionality of
the mailbox and finds all services that are triggered to perform password
request change. The search could be limited to recent mails with a known
targeted senders.
After a while, the attacker finds password recovery mails and builds a
search query pointing to single recovery mail, while including a keyword to
the known prefix of the secret authentication token. In our example, the
prefix is ’token=’. After, the attacker grows payload character by character
based on the measurements and finally retrieves the secret and launches the
password reset successfully.
4.2.1 Breadth-first search algorithm
For a environments having nearly minimal jitter, a simple heap algorithm
works well. The algorithm flow is represented in Image 4.1.
In every iteration, the largest time candidate is popped from the heap.
The candidate URL is measured and for each character available a new can-
didate is built using same URL prefix where each character is appended one
at a time. All those candidates are copied back to the heap including a
fresh timed value. After, a new iteration begins. In this way, this breadth
first search (BFS) alike algorithm navigates promising paths. The algorithm
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Figure 4.1: Cross-site Search Extractor:Breadth-first Search Algorithm
has no trigger to detect when the iterating should be terminated and thus
continues forever.
Faulty measurements on the correct track cause issues when the measured
value settles lower than some incorrect path measurement, that is because it
is unlikely that the algorithm will come back to test that branch and thus
the rest of time the search will spend building junk. In addition, faulty mea-
surements from incorrect paths are not an issue. When the algorithm takes a
wrong path, it iterates over whole alphabet but finds no large measurements
and jumps back to the previous track.
The mentioned algorithm has no ability to recover specific faulty mea-
surements. When measuring over various environments and especially over
Internet, it is likely that after hundreds of requests a fault happens. The
special constraints of the varying network conditions demands a more appro-
priate solutions for targeting browsers over Internet.
4.2.2 Depth-first search algorithm
At finally, we build a bit different approach that implements depth-first
search algorithm and deals better over varying network conditions. The
implementation verifies a chosen suffix before accepting, and furthermore is
able to survive from any single faulty measurement by observing the overall
situation. The algorithm flow is represented in Image 4.2.
In every iteration we are growing prefix with a character that took the
longest time of the round. Depth-first search (DFS) algorithm takes the
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Figure 4.2: Cross-site Search Extractor:Depth-first Search Algorithm
character from the heap, just like breadth first search. The difference is that
the heap is cleared after every time a character is inserted or removed from
the chosen prefix path, so actually, a heap structure could be replaced with a
max-function. In a single iteration, the payload prefix continues a character
forward or backward. The backward step happens when algorithm thinks
that it has took the wrong path.
The wrong path is recognized in a verification step, which is done in-
stantly after a best character candidate is chosen from the heap. The chosen
prefix including best candidate character must take longer time than a fresh
measurement with an empty reference payload. The path is wrong, if the
precondition is not met in a couple of measurement attempts. In this veri-
fication step, the algorithm could be done to performance better over short
delays by ensuring the verification step using stronger statistical methods
before proceeding.
The empty payload works as reference time, and it should be refreshed
regularly to react network changes. This could be done, for example, in cor-
rect path stage by including an empty payload to the queue, and afterwards
just update the tolerance value based on that.
The reference payload should be similar order of magnitude than the
(correct) path we are validating, and thus the algorithm reverses pointlessly.
However, the unnecessary backward step probability is decreased by increas-
ing verification reload attempts and by tolerating a bit larger variation, in
example, accept measurements that are 20 milliseconds faster.
The algorithm is optimized to ignore rest of potential characters instantly
after a measurement triggers a time that is larger than previous reference
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time. In that case, the verification should be done normally. This op-
timization terminates a search on average after alphabet size/2 character
measurements. The expected total average measurement count drops to
(alphabet size/2) ∗ token length. In order to maintain a clear basic flow of
the algorithm, the optimization is not included in the presented flow image.
To simplify the main points of the implemented DFS Cross-site search
extractor algorithm:
• In every iteration, algorithm tries all charset characters one by one,
and before a next iteration continues by adding slowest character at
end of the current prefix. However, before character is accepted, it has
to exceed measured reference point during two verification attempts
• If reference point test fails the correct path is lost, and a character is
removed one at a time, until reference point test succeed
• Reference point is time taken from a static empty query that is known
to be correct and which it is updated regularly to react fast changing
environmental delays
• Algorithm moves to the verification step instantly after measured char-
acter exceed reference time (optimization)
• No two measurements are performed at the same time. No a new
resource load until previous has finished or errored out
The practical implementation is a bit more complex, because the javascript
content timing requires event based approach, thus the main loop is actually
an event-loop, where a set of event-triggers are calling each others.
4.2.3 Setbacks
During developing and experimenting it became clear that measurements
do have many errors factors and proper error handling is required to sur-
vival from the faulty measurements. In every iteration we prefer character
that took longest time of the round, and because of the network congestion,
browser scheduling and other delays it is likely that in time to time a wrong
character hangs a bit longer and a wrong prefix path is chosen. We succeed
overcoming those issues by implementing verification and recovery state to
the DFS algorithm.
The implementation generates hundreds of elements to the DOM. Single
element is removed instantly after single measurement is done, but anyway,
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the browser slows down little by little. Thus, to avoid extra jitter between
experiments, the browser should be restarted every time. Furthermore, the
developer mode, including debugger and network activity window causes a
significant jitter that makes the attack fail.
The ideal implementation should adapt in various environments and work
over different connections and browsers. A larger jitter could be filtered
by performing more measurements, but it is a trade-off between amount of
required measurements for unique payloads versus amount of time required
to measure a single payload when limited total time is available. In future, we
could make algorithm to dynamically adapt for those conditions by issuing
more or less requests during verification state.
4.2.4 Limitations
Our implementation assumes multiple things about the environment. At
first, underlying html elements operate over HTTP GET requests and for
this reason, our attack targets search implementations that supports GET
requests.
It is required, that the search functionality works over partial search words
and that the search query length has no significant effect to the timing. In
addition, active browser session and stable enough network connection is
required between browser and targeted web application. Also, the search
must have a measurable timing difference between results versus no results.
Another limitation is that the attack is mitigated, when the search func-
tionality is protected with CSRF token. More details about mitigating this
issue is represented in chapter 3.2.6. In many situations, the service provider
would like giving user an opportunity to add custom search keyword page to
a browser favorites, but this expiring CSRF token would make it fail.
Alternative server mitigation implementation, is to prevent cross-origin
embedding and implement query field in an URL fragment section that is lo-
cated after hash(#) character. Iframe timing attacks are one of the multiple
reasons to disable cross-origin iframes using server security headers. Fur-
thermore, because the javascript builds the actual query request, it is simple
to add CSRF token to the actual API request.
When the query is in the fragment section, the query is available only
for same-origin javascript, and the server will not receive it, nor process
it. When using content embedders like script and img-tag, they are not
executing javascript which is mixed inside html content, thus there are no
place for leaking timing differences.
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4.3 Mozilla Firefox socket timeout issue
During this thesis write up, we managed to find serious security vulnerability
from the Mozilla Firefox browser product. We go through thinking process
and list how a minor socket timeout issue were eventually evaluated to a
serious vulnerability when exploited server response delay. We also introduce
actions the vulnerability process management included.
The presented issue is not a timing attack, but it has many properties
that are discussed in this thesis. For example, a related research chapter
includes clever ways to escalate security issues, the concept of sessions and
their relation to the cross-site request forgeries are already explained and a
concept of manipulating operations for performing slower and thus achieving
a better measurements is clear. Thus, we decided to introduce the issue in
this thesis, immediately after practical timing tools are dealt with.
4.3.1 Favicon socket handling
We found out that the Firefox launches favicon request which will not timeout
or close when related browser window is closed. The favicon is a small website
icon associated to a specific website, which is shown in the browser’s address
bar. At first, the server could spy how long the browser stays open after page
close by delaying initialized transmission indefinitely and wait until there is
a moment when connectivity problem occurs.
The issue sounds like a minor issue but it does have a bigger security
impact. One possible exploitable scenario exist in the Tor Browser product
which is based on the Mozilla Firefox and thus inherits same issues. Tor
Browser anonymizes user browsing and offers multiple security hardenings to
hide any privacy leakages that could help third-party server owner to classify
unauthenticated browser sessions together.
Tor Browser has a new identity feature which cleans up any active session
cookies, temporary environmental values, forces a new ip address and even
makes browser to do soft reboot which closes all active windows. As you can
guess, there is a fault that the favicon connection is not terminated after soft
browser reboot which gives server owner ability to deduce that the browser is
still open and user may have just tried to hide browsing history by initializing
a new identity.
For example, if the user continues surfing on the curious server after soft
reboot and after a while closes the browser. The browser closes which in turn
closes the original favicon connection and the current connection exactly at
the same time. Thus, the server owner could easily indicate that the sessions
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are ran by the same browser instance. More research should be done to figure
out how the leaked online time could be utilized and is there other practical
harm to the end user that could be done.
4.3.2 Delayed CSRF attack
We studied the favicon timeout issue in practice and found another conse-
quence of the bug, which we are calling as delayed CSRF attack from a closed
page. The attack server includes a http redirection header to a vulnerable
favicon retriever and delays the response until desired amount of time. Fav-
icon request respects redirection headers and the favicon service attach a
fresh cookie header to the request. Thus, because of the redirection, we are
also able to perform new connections after page close. The attack is finalized
by redirecting user to the vulnerable service.
Since, the target service is vulnerable to the CSRF the attacker could
have perform the attack instantly. However, the point is, that the victim
may not have active session to the target service when victim has opened the
attacker’s page. Usually, attacker could wait and try to exploit CSRF issue
as long as the attacker’s page is open, but our finding leverages the attack
surface to the moment when the user has closed the suspicious page. We
measured that the attack succeed even after 30 min from the page close.
Since, Mozilla Firefox accepts multiple ongoing favicon requests to the
same site we can leverage the chance to perform a payload request at a right
time period where the user has logged in. In more precisely, we trigger the
favicon request to load several times and delay the response timings. We
delay those requests and release one at a time in a controlled manner, which
leads us to perform CSRF attack at regular intervals after page close.
4.3.3 Manage over connection drops
An attacker may force browser to perform redirection to arbitrary address
even after the browser page is closed and network connection is disconnected
for a short moment. The favicon service supports multiple ongoing favicon
requests to the same service, where only dozen of those are requested at
the same time. Rest connection attempts are queued in order. We are
not familiar how the exact queueing system operates, but the queueing is a
impact of browser’s max connection limit targeted to specific host.
This makes the attack more interesting, because of that feature our set-up
supports short a couple of minute connection disconnects during the attack.
When the connection drops, the favicon service attempts a reconnect and
after a while gives up and moves to a next malicious request. A large queue
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performs longer and defeats the network drop better. Thus, when we discon-
nect a single connection, the favicon service launches a new connection from
the queue. The queue can hold thousands of requests without a significant
performance loss.
There are multiple situations where disconnection may happen during
an attack. For example, an victim could carelessly surf on the cafe guest
network. Later, when she swaps current connection to a trusted VPN con-
nection or respectively walks back to the office the CSRF payload is launched
and the targeted vulnerable internal service is compromised.
In addition to the method to perform delayed CSRF attack to the internal
network it is violation of the user privacy because we may track the user
across multiple IP addresses as the user changes networks. The fresh IP
address leaks to the favicon server because when the user swaps the network,
the living favicon TCP connection drops and favicon service launches a new
from the queue.
4.3.4 Theoretical follow-up attack
In a previous main chapter, we introduced an attack which extracts data from
target page using timing leaks. Later, we mentioned how to launch a page
requests from a closed page. Now, we may have a chance to compound the
attacks, and perform cross-site search extractor attack behind the delayed
CSRF attack. The following described attack is theoretical, and not tested
in action, thus there is a large chance that it will not operate as expected.
The search extractor attack required Javascript to perform requests, mea-
sure timings and to determine how the attack should proceed next steps
based on the obtained knowledge. We may have chance to perform this at-
tack without any client side logistic and ability to perform Javascript. The
attack would be based on the assumption, that the browser supports a large
favicon queue and operates new connections deterministic enough.
We introduce a large static page, which consists thousands of favicon el-
ements that are targeted to the attacker’s server. The attacker has ability
to perform page redirection to the vulnerable target server, and control the
exact moment when the redirection should be issued. The Firefox browser
has a upper limit of parallel connections the whole browser process has glob-
ally. Thus, after filling the global connection limit, we may issue a redirect
request to a vulnerable server. The current connection disconnects and a
new prioritized connection to the vulnerable server is issued. The new con-
nection disconnects instantly after target server responds. The connection is
closed, which releases one global connection reservation, which is instantly
used to perform a new favicon load. After following chain of events, we mea-
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sure how long it takes that the browser issues the redirect to the state where
the browser issues a new favicon connection. The measurement contains the
server processing time we are interested.
The attacker server controls browser to create requests to the vulnerable
server, has ability to measure how long the request took and build new re-
quests dynamically based on the learned knowledge. Thus, in this threat, we
could perform search extractor attack from the closed browser page which
enlarge the timeframe available to perform proper attack. The attack is the-
oretical idea, which should be handled as one. This theoretical attack relies
the browser mechanisms and assume the browser behaves as described.
4.3.5 Vulnerability process management
We reported two bugs to the Mozilla’s Bugzilla bug tracker. The first re-
ported bug is 1255270 [41] which relates to an issue that Favicon request
doesn’t timeout, or close when related window is closed. The second bug
1255267 [42] notes that it is possible to perform delayed CSRF attack from
the closed page. Both bugs were reported on March 9, 2016.
We marked them as security bugs which reduced potential observers heav-
ily and made issue hidden from the public during the processing and repairing
stage. Eventually, the developers saw second bug as duplicate of the first and
handled bugs like an single issue. We had close access to follow whole repair
process and participate.
Firefox has a lot of software components, and it took time from devel-
opers to find which component was responsible for related favicon timeouts.
The issue was that there was no original implementation relating to the fav-
icon timeouts. Developers had to design and decide where the connection
monitoring system should be done. For example, Mozilla2:ImageLib [43] is
optimised for loading images, decoding and displaying but it doesn’t initialize
network request. Networking component on the other hand executes requests
but has no knowledge about the front-end window navigation triggers, and
thus can’t decide when the request should be cancelled. The final patch
modified setAndFetchFaviconForPage network API to make it possible to
cancel request afterwards, and added proper dom-window-destroyed observer
notification to trigger cancel function when the inner window is closed.
Afterwards, fixing the issue turned out to be a bit more challenging than
expected. A new bug 1279208 [44] was submitted to tracker to approach bug
from a new viewpoint on June 9, 2016. However, we pointed out that even
the new implemented patch did not cover all corner cases and the browser
was still vulnerable. Two bugs, 1283067 [45] and 1285196 [46] were issued
on June 29 and July 7, 2016.
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After those, we could finally verify that the patch fixes issues correctly.
The bugs were closed, and the vulnerability was announced at the public [47]
on August 2, 2016, with a code name CVE-2016-2830 [48]. The bug was
approved to the Mozilla’s client bug bounty program [49], and was awarded
as an high level vulnerability.
Chapter 5
Demonstrative experiment
In this chapter we are experimenting how HTML element timings are reacting
where targeted resource amount of bytes, processing time and document
dependencies are altered. We compare how different elements measure this
same action. Furthermore, we are also experimenting how presented cross-
origin search extractor attack works against simulated web mail and how
the server delay affects to the attack. The chapter begins with overview
of the measurement environment and proceeds describing features we are
measuring.
5.1 Experiment setup
Figure 5.1: Measurement environment
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The measurement environment is represented in figure 5.1. It consists
of a laptop in office network that has regular Internet connection to a web
server located in our home. In this measurement setup, the server serves
measurement tool, search extractor tool, all cross-origin test files and mailbox
simulation service.
In a regular attack, the attack tool and targeted application are not served
under same server. However, we saw no issue that would endanger results
because of the chosen arrangements. The measurement and attack tool could
have been executed locally on the client machine, but in the end it were
simpler to keep them in the same place where the rest of the files are.
Furthermore, because we focus on cross-origin attacks, it is important
that the measurement tool has no same-origin access to targeted files. Oth-
erwise, the browser control flow might differ and affect the timing results
making them in practice worthless. Thus, we ensure cross-origin behavior by
launching tools over direct ip address, and loading all the rest test files over
a domain. This way, the cross-origin requirement applies, even the files are
served from the same place.
The all measurements were done on a up-to-date Windows 10 on the
end of the August. The computer is Dell Latitude E7450 laptop with 16
GB of RAM. The measurements were done on the Ruoholahti office over
a wifi network that was connected to a wired Internet. The latency from
client to the server was 8 ms RTT, and short test indicates a 0% packet loss.
Bandwidth to the server was measured to be 6 MB/s download, and 4 MB/s
upload.
Tested web browser is Mozilla Firefox Browser version 45.2.0 that was
released in March 8, 2016. We rely on JavaScript events and their timings,
which are standardised APIs and widely supported over various browsers [3].
Thus, it is very likely that the following measurements could be performed on
any browser, but in order to save extra work, we will specify measurements
to a single web browser. The Mozilla Firefox is chosen, because we have most
personal experience about it, and in addition, a delayed CSRF attack which
is introduced later in this thesis relays closely on its faulty implementation.
The server locates in Otaniemi, which has 8 km distance from the Ruoho-
lahti. It hosts the measurement tool and the targeted measurable resources.
The server has Ubuntu Linux 16.04.1 Long Term Support operating system,
which serves the files over the Apache/2.4.18 web server. The Apache configs
are left as original. The processor is Intel Core 2 Duo E6750 and there are
4 GB of ram memory. The server is connected to the FUNET network [50]
and has a gigabit network connection over the Internet.
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5.2 Load time measurements
We could go wild and measure how real world applications are handling tim-
ings. However, to simplificate measurement scenarios and to avoid launch-
ing thousands of requests to third party sites, we decided to make a three
measurement scenarios to our server that are requested over Internet in our
introduced experimentation setup.
We found three potential features that are at least affecting to the timing.
We build a specific measurement scenarios to handle all of them individually.
The exact measurement scenarios are in the appendix section of thesis but
briefly they are the following:
• A first measurement scenario measures how the response size affects to
the response time. It contains a document that has character A 30k
times in a row. The document is compared to a document that has 100
A characters in a row.
• Second measurement scenario measures how browser handles subdoc-
ument loading and rendering. It contains a HTML document that em-
beds six internal image elements versus a page with only one of those
dependencies.
• Third measurement scenario measures how the server process time ef-
fects to the response time. It demonstrates a simplified search engine,
which delays the answer 25 milliseconds if the hit occurs. We compare
this hit to a query keyword that causes no delay.
In general, time differences are irrelevant and we are more interested in
measuring the differences in latency across measured events. Timing results
are shown as box and whisker plot, which is ideal for comparing distributions
of measurements. The measurements are intended to give a good compact
overview about the distributions. Specially, we are interested about median,
time range and skews in the data. We are comparing distributions graphi-
cally, which adds inaccuracy. However, main conclusions are based on the
features that are clearly visible, so we are not dealing them in greater sta-
tistical depth. Measurement application provides measurements as comma
separated values that are then imported to Microsoft Excel to build graphical
plots.
We are performing those mentioned measurements multiple times so it
is inevitable that caching occurs in multiple levels. A hypothesis is, that
a caching may confuse the results. However, as long as a there is a clear
difference in measurement results, the application is vulnerable, it makes no
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difference whatever or not a specific cache was used, as long as it is repeatable.
However, so that we can make the attack more accurate, we must eventually
understand the reason. If the caching could be tampered on purpose, the
attack surface grows and handles both scenarios.
Every element has 1000 measurements to both targets, which means that
a single graph represents 12000 requests overall. Overall measurements for
comparing two pages in application took approximately 15 minutes that is a
bit more than 13 request / second. We made three measurement scenarios.
We introduce them in the same order mentioned before.
5.3 Cross-site search extractor
We introduced a Cross-site Search Extractor attack that manages to steal
secret tokens from specific cross-origin pages using timing differences. In lab-
oratory environment, we may alter the delay difference in arbitrarily manner.
In practical attack to a real service, we have no direct method to control
timing delays. It is sure that the attack fails when the delay measurements
between different responses are small enough. In this experiment, we study
how the delay affects to the attack.
We build a vulnerable server simulating a simple webmail search func-
tionality. The service takes a search word as input, and responses whether
the server has content about that word. In this experiment, the perceivable
delay is added manually to the implementation using sleep command. Now,
because we control this value, we can observe how the attack implementation
behaves under different delays.
Our load time measurement experimentation points out that there are at
least three features that are measurable by timings. In this implementation,
we rely on the server delay changes. Our approach is based on the assumption
that the server process search query longer when a hit occurs and finishes
faster without hits.
It is particularly interesting to find a smallest delay difference where the
attack still works, because it implies the magnitude of delay difference re-
quired to perform attack. Later, in security assessments, we could just mea-
sure delays and with this knowledge, conclude the implementation as vulner-
able. The tests are done using a single network connection setup with stable
jitter. Thus, it is likely, that the attack may fail even with larger delays when
the jitter dominates.
The vulnerable server code is following:
<?php
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$delay = 38*1000; // milliseconds
$message = "Dear user, Someone recently requested a password
change for your account. If you don’t want to change your
password or didn’t request this, just ignore and delete this
message.
If this was you, you can set a new password here:
https://example.com/reset?token=d7a8fbb307d7809469ca9abcb008
2e4f8d5651e46d3cdb762d02d0bf37c9e592.
To keep your account secure, please don’t forward this email to
anyone. See our Help Center for more security tips. Thanks!";
$u = urldecode($_GET[’query’]);
if (strpos($message,$u) !== false) {
usleep($delay);
$output = ’Content found!’
} else {
$output = ’Sorry, no content!’;
}
?>
<html><head></head><body>Email Inbox - Search engine
<br><br>Search query: <?php echo htmlentities($u); ?> <br>
<textarea rows=’4’ cols=’100’>
<?php echo htmlentities($output); ?>
</textarea>
</body></html>
The vulnerable server has a secret token d7a8fbb307d7809469ca9abcb0082
e4f8d5651e46d3cdb762d02d0bf37c9e592, which is sha256 hash of text ’The
quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog’. The hash is 64 characters long,
and the keyspace is a-z0-9. We initialize our attacks by choosing search pre-
fix and reference timing point as keyword ’token=’. We measure how long it
takes to steal this secret token by varying delay.
5.4 Measurement results
In this chapter, we show how the measurement tool performs recognizing
cross-origin timings. We will find out how HTML embedder timings are
performing against each other depending on the measured context.
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5.4.1 Load time measurements
In this section, we evaluate what kind of results load time measurement tool
collects. We test how timings are behaving in three measurement scenarios
covering different features that are all leaking timings.
5.4.1.1 Results
In the following scenarios we have six different elements and we measure
how their box and whisker distributions differ. Boxes are not describing
taken time directly. They are describing timing difference of two requests of
the same element that targets two different pages in the site we are trying
compare. The JavaScript program runs on the browser and measures the
time spent between before and after loading a resource. Subtracting the
two measured times yields the spent time difference, which is shown as an
distribution.
Figure 5.2: Measuring timings of 100 byte payload compared to 30k bytes
In Figure 5.2 we have a measurement scenario altering response size.
Figure shows the distribution of loading time difference measured using a
JavaScript Web page embedding document with a size of 100 bytes versus
30000 bytes.
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At first, the measurements have long error bars and a large number of
outliers. Outliers are points that are 1.5*IQR beyond the quartiles. Fetch
distribution is packed closely around the median. Median is higher than zero
level, which is surprisingly when all other components are very close to zero
or lower. The fetch is not that far away, but when taking into a small packed
distribution size there could be something strange happening with it also.
Zero median level indicates that in our test run the measured targets had
no measurable difference. The further away the median is from zero level, the
more likely there is some relational behaviours to object examined. When
closer to zero, the measurement is more difficult to be utilized in practical
attack and there is a larger chance that the measurement is inside the error
margin, especially with a large distributions.
Iframe and embed has their second quartile including rest of quartiles
are below the zero. This means that byte test that had a larger amount of
bytes took longer to operate. It is a bit unexpected that iframe and embed
are leaking timings more than others, because the same amount of traffic is
supposed to be transmitted. The reason might be, that they both are suc-
cessfully rendering those contents to the screen, where the rest script, img
and video elements quickly recognize the wrong media content and inter-
rupt transmission and execution. On the other hand entities might include
Accept-header that restricts response to specific content on the server side,
which makes the server build an empty response. Different entities might
also have more aggressive caching mechanisms that drops data transmission
time to zero.
In Figure 5.3 we have a measurement scenario altering image resource
count. We compare loading a page containing a six images versus a single
one. As a result, all boxes are around zero. The most significant observation
is that with iframe and embed medians are clearly lower than rest of the
elements. All other elements have median closer zero. This is expected,
because there is no large amount of difference in bytes. Furthermore, zero
medians indicates a good accuracy of the results.
Iframe and embed are the only elements that are parsing context as
HTML, and which are reacting to its resource dependencies. They fetch
those resources, which produces a couple of HTTP requests. In our measure-
ment scenario, the dependencies are served dynamically, which prevents the
use of browser cache.
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Figure 5.3: Measuring timings of loading six non-cached image resources
Figure 5.4: Measuring timings of server delaying response 25 milliseconds
In Figure 5.4 measurement scenario we are altering server response delay.
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First page targeted has no extra delay, and the second has 25 ms per request.
As a result, the fetch measurement has entirely different results than all
others. The others are reacting server delay increase with a larger operating
time, which is extremely understandable. The medians are a bit less than -
20 milliseconds. Precisely, the in-order millisecond medians are -0.17, -22.98,
-24,40, -24.51, -25.40 and -24.24.
The fetch measures the process time after the response has arrived until it
is processed, which clarifies the situation that there is no related dependences
to server time. Furthermore, its median is close to the zero that indicates a
good quality of the measurements.
5.4.1.2 Analysis
We measured three different scenarios that affects to the timings. We found
out, that iframe and embed leaks timings in all cases. We also found, that
those have a bit larger distribution than others. This might be a bit prob-
lematic for an attacker, because comparing a larger distribution requires a
bit more measurements to make assurance level high enough. Furthermore,
script element performed well in the byte and server delay test. For some
reason img and video elements failed to measure response content length
difference.
Based on the results, when targeting server delay, we suggest using very
commonly used script element. Otherwise, embed element seems to have a
bit smaller distribution than iframe. Thus, we recommend using embed when
targeting resources using altering dependencies and varying content lengths.
We conclude that over stable Internet, size difference of 30 kilobytes pay-
load against 100 bytes is detectable. We found that 25 millisecond processing
time difference is detectable and exploitable. We also noted, that a page that
renders six dynamic images against one is detectable. We compared the re-
sults graphically, thus the numbers are indicative and are intended to show
the magnitude of the difference required to be detectable easily.
In this experiment, we managed to reveal distribution differences in a
form of box and whisker plot. In real world attack, we would still have to
figure out how many measurements is required to achieve sufficient level of
assurance to perform more far-reaching decisions.
5.4.2 Cross-site search extractor
In table 5.1 measurements indicate about how long it takes to steal secret
token from our cross-origin site using search extractor attack:
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5.4.2.1 Results
Delay(ms) Requests Backwards Time(s)
500 2226 3 238.874
400 2137 3 191.79
300 2187 1 154.155
200 1910 0 94.254
100 2091 1 73.396
75 2241 5 74.837
60 2560 11 81.405
50 2396 6 61.307
40 2531 11 70.218
35 2634 12 65.697
30 4575 45 123.258
25 5587 58 132.152
23 19094 255 433.825
22 43989 717 1201.644
20 33684 302 -
Table 5.1: Server delay difference affecting to cross-origin search extractor
attack
The graph 5.5 represents same table values in a graph.
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Figure 5.5: Server delay difference affecting to cross-origin search extractor
attack
There is certain correlation between delay and solve time despite the
fact that the amount of measurement points is low. Performing multiple
measurements manually took a lot of time, which reduced the total measure-
ment count as low as 15. Largest data point is left out of the graph to ensure
better visibility over the more interesting points.
5.4.2.2 Analysis
The secret token is built using alphabet of characters a-z0-9. In a basic
implementation without measurement errors, the required measurements to-
tal are expected to be count of alphabet size ∗ token length. Our token
is 64 character long, and it has 36 character alphabet. Thus, the required
measurements are size of 2304. However, there are six measurements out
of 15 below 2300 measurements. It is possible, because our implementation
included a optimization where we are skipping rest of character candidates
when a promising one is already found. Also, the total amount varies because
of measurement errors and backward-steps.
It seems that after 100 ms server delay, the solve time grows linearly
based on the delay. The linearity is logical, because a large delay causes
longer character candidate checks and thus large solving time even when
check measure reliability is reinforced . That is because those time taking
measurements have to be performed hundreds or thousands of times. After
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the required reliable level have been reached, the spare delay just slow down
the attack. Furthermore, larger delay values could still not protect all outlier
measurements that are magnitude larger. This can be seen from the intro-
duced table, which has backward steps even though the delay is as large as
500 ms.
The amount of measurements is too low to approximate how the delay
function behaves exactly within short delays. However, small enough delay
increases solve time. Jitter makes single measurements unstable and the
algorithm consumes time by continuous getting lost from the correct path
and causes time-consuming backward steps. At some point when decreasing
the delay enough, the jitter overwhelms the current implementation and the
attack fails.
The attack works reliable in measurement environment when the delay is
larger than 40 ms. Solving 64 bytes secret takes roughly one to three minute,
which is long time for user to stay on the attacker’s page. However, when
the token is reduced to eight characters, the attack takes five seconds on
40 ms delay, and 500 ms delay consumes 22 seconds. Furthermore, the at-
tack implementation could be optimized further, for example instead of using
serial requests make them parallel. When making multiple connections par-
allel, you must pay attention to browser global and host specific connection
limits.
Chapter 6
Discussion
The user interface of the measurement tool is presented as matrix form al-
lowing adding a new measurement features as part of the others. The im-
plementation was made for long-term usage, and it bends over a new future
features that are left out of the scope of this assessment. At current repre-
sentation, the timing measurement tool separates triggered callbacks, which
are valuable information when studying the attack surface [51].
In a demonstrative experiment we introduced three measurement scenar-
ios that are leaking timings. We are not aware how popular those scenarios
occurs in practice but it is likely that there are services which do not expect
that the cross-origin page could find out the response difference of submitted
payloads [52]. Besides, the measurement tool is made exactly for investigat-
ing those issues in practical environments.
Prior research analyses covering cross-origin resource sizes and differences
have been published before [32]. Goethem, Vanhoef, and Piesses found out
that files with a difference in size of less than 15kB or larger than 140kB could
not be differentiated when using classical content loading methods [15]. We
did not benchmark our measurement tool accuracy but at least in demonstra-
tive experiment we found out that 30kB difference is noticeable. However,
we noticed that even tiny 256 bytes difference in resources is catchable when
target is having nested dependencies. Furthermore, we found out that server
processing time difference larger than 25 ms is measurable.
We utilized box and whisker distributions for showing that the imple-
mented measurement tool works. This experiment also reveals difference
between HTML element performing the measurement. Based on performed
measurement scenarios we managed to recognize the distribution difference
between different HTML elements and succeed recommend specific elements
for specific situations.
The performed measurement experiment proves that the measurement
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tool performed the measurements successfully and operates within a preci-
sion enough to identify some potential timing issues. Graphical box and
whisker comparison work well for this demonstrative purpose but for future
measurements we should find a more accurate way to compare those distri-
butions.
Introduced Cross-site search extractor method improves previously known
XS-search attack [34]. We introduce how this XS-search attack could steal
any previously unknown token. Our attack constructs secret token character
by character in contrast to before published method that identify terms from
large dictionaries. Our attack makes the XS-search attack more serious but
in contrast demands more from the targeted environment.
Demonstrative cross-site search extractor attack experiment were per-
formed in Mozilla Firefox browser over stable Internet connection. The tool
works surprisingly well and offers stable results as long as the target has
observable timing leakage. The attack tool most likely works with differ-
ent browsers and environments. For example, the preliminary experimenting
shows that the attack works even over mobile network using Samsung Galaxy
S5 mobile phone and Chrome 52.0.2743.98 browser.
This thesis considers timing attacks as a main attack vector for revealing
resource sizes but there are many other side channel leakages [52] that could
be utilized when exploiting presented extractor attack method.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
We investigated a method to measure external resource load timings. We
then designed and implemented a tool to perform those measurements. The
introduced measurement tool in itself is a valuable tool for security assess-
ments, where security of the studied environment is under surveillance.
We experimented how HTML element timings are reacting where amount
of bytes, processing time and document dependencies are altered. We found
out, that all of those are leaking vulnerable timings and our measurement
tool works. In order, to make those measurements more valuable form, we
implemented a penetrative attack tool that takes over cross-origin search
page timing leaks and exploits them to reveal cross-origin secrets.
In our measurement environment, we simulated mailbox and managed to
steal forgot password link from simulated mailbox only by luring mailbox
victim to follow a site controlled by an attacker. The attack exploits before
published cross-site search attack further and manages to steal custom tokens
instead of trying to iterate over a list of known words single word at a time
to find out what of those make an actual hit.
The experiment was performed in specific environment and successful
attack relays on many factors, which makes the real-word attack less common.
Timing attacks are serious vulnerabilities and they should be treated as such.
The timing attack touches the implementation as a whole and the timing
mistakes are a sum of inner mistakes.
The third and last practical publication made it clear that Firefox im-
plementation has a severe security vulnerability relating to favicon socket
handling. The attack is not a timing attack, as an word actual context, how-
ever, the attack is still made by manipulating time. We leveraged the issue
to a possibility to launch arbitrary page requests over victim’s browser even
after time has passed and the malicious page is closed. When publishing this
thesis, the issue has been already reported to the Mozilla and security patch
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has been already published.
Overall, as seen in this thesis, timing security issues have a lot of potential,
even though they are more difficult to utilize than simpler security holes.
Not enough attention has been paid to this class of vulnerabilities, which
can mean worse attacks in the future especially if better automated tools
become readily available. We hope that the this thesis raise awareness of
timing attacks in web browser world and web application implementers and
security testers take the raised issues into account.
7.1 Future work
During this study, it became clear, that there are no public tools available
for measuring cross-origin timing issues. The practical impact of those at-
tacks cannot be comprehended without proper security applications that are
specialized to discover timing security issues. We would like to see more
applications that search for timing issues automatically and exploit vulnera-
bilities like our search extractor is doing, but with a larger scale in features
and a bigger budget. The created tool is a small attempt to find out its po-
tential as a concept. The security industry should study these issues more.
In future measurements, we could measure how browser memory layout
is affected by a site that uses another site as a cross-origin dependency. We
could measure memory usage by filling available memory with a junk, mea-
sure amount of reservable bytes and free the memory. Afterwards, we could
include a cross-origin element and measure how the memory space behaves.
Also, we could perform measurements to study whether filling up browser
connection limit, and/or performed high load affects the timing results. Our
load time measurement tool should work well, maybe even better with those
additions. Furthermore, the measurement accuracy could be improved by
using Crosby’s low-percentile filters when comparing timing results. They
were left out of this implementation to avoid broadening the scope of this
thesis too much.
Favicon timeout leakage reveals that socket timeouts are not very care-
fully tested. One reason could be that their testing environment does not
support those tests easily. Thus, we suppose there are a lot of potential that
the same mistakes are done later in other browser components. In general,
the issues in browser socket handling timing outs should be inspected more
specifically.
One simple way to reveal those weaknesses is to use an aggressive network
bandwidth limiter and investigate how the TCP streams are reacting to a
situation where a single browser window is closed. The data flows very slowly
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and we can then detect if there is an mechanism to issue a disconnection when
browser window is closed, otherwise the connection stays open and browser
component might still be ready to operate, even long time after the user has
left from the site. This may lead to a similar attacks that we demonstrated
in our socket timeout vulnerability.
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Appendix A
Measurement samples
The documents listed here were used for timing resource loads.
Listing A.1: byte sample1
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...[100 characters]
Listing A.2: byte sample2
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa...[30000 characters]
Listing A.3: delay sample1
<?php usleep(1); ?> usleep(1);
Listing A.4: delay sample2
<?php usleep(25000); ?> usleep(25000);
Listing A.5: embed sample1
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<img src="image1.php" alt="View1">
</body>
</html>
Listing A.6: embed sample2
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
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<body>
<img src="image1.php" alt="View1">
<img src="image2.php" alt="View2">
<img src="image3.php" alt="View3">
<img src="image4.php" alt="View4">
<img src="image5.php" alt="View5">
<img src="image6.php" alt="View6">
</body>
</html>
Where all of those included images have a photo of sailing boat with
259x194 resolution within a size of 4.90 kB.
